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J O S E P H  AL AG H A Hizbullah, Iran
a n d the Intifada
Twenty-one years ago, Imam Khumayni was
the first to inaugurate the last Friday of the
month of Ramadan as 'Quds Day' or
'Jerusalem Day', calling for the support of
Palestinians in any possible way and the es-
tablishment of a Muslim army to liberate
Jerusalem. He referred to Israel as the 'rapist
entity' (al-kiyan al-ghasib), the 'Zionist enti-
ty' (al-kiyan al-sahyuni) that is a cancerous
gland in the region and should be uprooted
at all costs. In Lebanon, on 22 December
2000, the commemoration of 'Quds Day'
had a new flavour because it was the first to
be held after the Israeli withdrawal, and be-
cause it coincided with the second Palestin-
ian Intifada that was characterized by sui-
cide missions causing heavy casualties on
the Israeli side. Also, it was the first time that
the Lebanese state sent an official represen-
tative – along with a minister and a repre-
sentative of the general of the Lebanese
army – to attend 'Quds Day', thus sheltering
the Hizbullah with the Lebanese govern-
ment's legitimacy.1
Conferences in support
o f t h e I n t i f a d a
From 28 to 30 January 2001, the 'First
Quds Conference' was held in Beirut to sup-
port the Palestinian Intifada. It led to the es-
tablishment of the 'Quds Foundation' with
temporary headquarters in Beirut, the 'capi-
tal of liberation and victory'. The final reso-
lutions included the following: severing any
engagements with the Middle East Peace
Settlement; calling for jihad and resistance
as well as political, economic, diplomatic,
and media support for the Intifada; boy-
cotting American goods; using oil as a stick
policy; refusing to naturalize the Palestinian
refugees in any country; the right of return
and self-determination to the Palestinians;
stopping all normalization procedures with
Israel; affirming that Jerusalem is the capital
of Palestine; lobbying in order to revive the
UN Resolution 3379 that stipulates that
Zionism is a form of racism; filing litigations
and preparing the required files concerning
Israeli war criminals; extolling the decision
of the Palestinians not to take part in the up-
coming Israeli elections; total support for
Lebanon in the continuation of the Resis-
tance until the S h i bca Farms – a 220 square
kilometre Lebanese territory still under Is-
raeli occupation – are regained; and the re-
lease of all detainees from Israeli prisons.
The primary speakers were Nasrallah and Ali
Akbar Muhtashami, an Iranian reformist and
an ally of Khatami. Muhtashami, the secre-
tary general of the International Committee
for the Support of the Intifada, urged every-
one to supply the Palestinian people with
arms, so that they can defend their legiti-
mate rights. He also reiterated the Islamic
Republic's solution to the Palestinian crisis,
namely, a general referendum that includes
the 'indigenous Palestinian people' com-
posed of adherents to the three Abrahamic
religions – who are spread worldwide and
inside the Occupied Territories – in order to
determine their future and the type of gov-
ernment to which they aspire. On his part,
Nasrallah affirmed that the Intifada, resis-
tance, and jihad should go hand in hand in
order to achieve victory, rather than futile
negotiations. Nasrallah called on the partic-
ipants to adopt Khumayni's injunction of
celebrating the last Friday of the month of
Ramadan as 'Quds Day'. Indeed, both his
calls were adopted in the final resolutions.2
After a lapse of ten years, Tehran hosted
the second Intifada Conference (April 2001).
M o s t Palestinian opposition groups attend-
ed this International Conference of Support
for the Intifada and the Islamic Revolution
i n Palestine, along with representatives
from 37 Arab and Islamic countries. Like the
'First Quds Conference' resolutions, the final
resolutions of the second conference con-
tained a clause affirming that the Lebanese
victory over the Israeli army in southern
Lebanon had opened new horizons with re-
spect to the Palestinian cause. It also legit-
imized the continuation of the Lebanese re-
sistance until the liberation of the S h i bca
Farms and the release of all the detainees in
Israeli prisons. In the wake of the Confer-
ence, while receiving Nasrallah, Imam
Khamin'i argued that the Aqsa I n t i f a d a i s
the result of the Hizbullah's struggles and
devotion, and that the current Intifada in
Palestine is awakening the sense of dignity
and strength among Palestinian Muslims
through the achievements of the Lebanese
Islamic resistance that materialized in liber-
ating Lebanon from the 'small Satan' (Israel)
after 22 years of occupation. He hailed the
Hizbullah's efforts in Lebanon, which ex-
horted the Palestinian people to rise up.
Khatami affirmed that the 'Zionist entity' is
the biggest threat posed to the Islamic and
Arab world. Referring to the Hizbullah's vic-
tory over the Israeli army in Lebanon, Khata-
mi held that '[s]hould the Zionist entity b e
defeated once, surely it will be defeated a n-
other time.' He added that Muslims should
defend the rights of the Palestinians and
mobilize their capabilities for the return of
the Palestinian refugees and their rights of
self-determination. Nasrallah stated: 'In the
name of Hizbullah and the Resistance, we
shall not stay idle; we shall assume our
moral, religious, and legitimate responsibili-
t i e s, and prove to the Zionists that the Pales-
tinians are not alone. We tell the Zionists:
"Be prepared to face us in places you expect
or do not expect to find us."'3
The status quo
The Hizbullah's ideological stance on the
continuation of the resistance and the liber-
ation of Palestine after the Israeli withdraw-
al from Lebanon is based on the distinction
between the Hizbullah's political ideology
(al-fikr al-siyasi) and political programme
(al-barnamaj al-siyasi). The Hizbullah hon-
oured, and still honours, its ideological pro-
gramme (commitment to the liberation of
Palestine, and no recognition of Israel) and
its political programme, namely that 'so-
cioeconomic, intellectual, and cultural work
is concomitant with resistance and should
go hand in hand with it.' As Nasrallah puts it:
'It is our "legitimate and religious responsi-
bility" [al-mas'uliyya a l - s h a rci y y a wa al-taklif
a l - s h a rci a l - I l a h i]4 to buttress the Palestinian
Intifada in any way we find fit.'5 In actual
practice, the Hizbullah's support for the In-
tifada is limited to political, moral and psy-
chological measures. Nasrallah exhorted the
Palestinians to keep the initiative in their
own hands and to depend on no one except
themselves. Nasrallah said unequivocally
that the Hizbullah does not have a branch in
Palestine or in any other country: 'There is
no Palestinian Hizbullah.' He added that all
of the Hizbullah's rank and file are honoured
to be soldiers fighting under the banner of
Hamas, of the Islamic Jihad, or any Palestin-
ian jihad organization.6 Thus, liberating
Palestine is not an aim; rather, it is a doctri-
nal-ideological commitment. Since Israel's
withdrawal from Lebanon is incomplete be-
cause of its refusal to relinquish the S h i bca
Farms, the Hizbullah's resistance continues
because it is not a militia, but rather the
Lebanese resistance par excellence; this is
one of the main sources of the Hizbullah's
political legitimacy. It is important to note
that all of the Hizbullah's operations in the
Lebanese S h i bca Farms were a show of soli-
darity dedicated to the Palestinian people.
By the end of 2001 seven of the S h i bca o p e r-
ations were carried out by the 'Battalion of
the Aqsa Martyrs' of the Islamic Resistance –
the Hizbullah's military wing, and the kid-
napping of the three Israeli soldiers was car-
ried out by the 'Battalion of the Martyr
Muhammad al-Durra' (one of the most well-
known Palestinian child martyrs).
After September 11
In the aftermath of September 11, US pol-
icy concerning the Hizbullah remained un-
changed. In April 2001, it had been classi-
fied by the US State Department as a 'terror-
ist organization'. After September 11, three
additional lists were issued, which either in-
cluded Hizbullah members or asked the
Lebanese government to freeze the Hizbul-
lah's assets. In response, a national consen-
sus emerged expressing that Hizbullah is
not a terrorist organization.
No alterations have been made in the
Hizbullah's doctrines as a result of Septem-
ber 11, although some manoeuvres and
camouflage tactics were modified. On 28
September 2001, the first anniversary of the
Intifada, Nasrallah threatened – behind bul-
let-proof glass (see photo) – that '[w]e are
ready for direct military intervention in the
Intifada when the benefit of the Palestinian
resistance really dictates recourse to this
option.' With these words, Nasrallah quali-
fied his threat and rendered his statement
ambiguous. On 2 October 2001 Nasrallah re-
iterated that nothing has changed since
September 11: 'Our culture is that of jihad,
resistance, and martyrdom.' He added that
the Hizbullah still opts for the 'military, jihad
option' to liberate Lebanon from Israeli oc-
cupation and to support the Palestinian In-
t i f a d a with all its might.7 On 22 October
2001, while commemorating the 'Day of the
Wounded of the Islamic Resistance' Nasral-
lah affirmed that '[t]hose who killed Za'ifi [Is-
raeli Minister of Tourism] are the most noble
members of this u m m a. Nothing will change
at all for us after 11 September 2001; the re-
sistance continues as long as S h i bca is occu-
pied, our prisoners of war are detained in Is-
raeli prisons, and the Palestinian people are
slaughtered. The Great Satan [the US] that
issues terrorist lists is a terrorist state that
has no right to classify people as terrorists
or not.'8
'We share the same destiny with the Palestinian I n-
t i f a d a till the liberation of Jerusalem.' With these
words Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, the Hizbullah's Secre-
tary General, opened the Solidarity Convention for
the Support of the Intifada in Beirut on 22 May 2001.
Rooted in the successful resistance against the Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon, the Hizbullah con-
tinues to be very vocal in its support of the Palestin-
ian cause.
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